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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEE JAY BIGLER and CAROL
BIGLER, his wife,
·Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL
COMAPNY and JOHN DOES I,
II and.III,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
DEE JAY BIGLER AND CAROL BIGLER, HIS WIFE

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action based on the negligent flooding of the
plaintiffs-respondents' _property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The action was tried on the 20th, 21st and 25th of January,
1982.

The case was then submitted to a jury to answer questions

on a special verdict form.

The jury found the defendant,

Mapleton Irrigation Canal Company, negligent and awarded
damages to the plaintiffs-respondents in the amount of $8,361.70.
It is from that judgment that the defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs~respondents

seek to have the judgment of the

lower court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pl_aintiffs-respondents, Dee Jay Bigler and Carol Bigler,
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are shareholders in the defendant Mapleton Irrigation Canal
Company, owning one share of Hobblecreek and one share of Strawberrv Water (R. 196).

The plaintiffs have been residents of

the city of Mapleton for fourteen years and-ha!f!e occupied the
home that was flooded for twelve years (R. 191, 384).

During

that entire period of time the plaintiffs have been irrigating
the .97 acre parcel of land where their home is located with
water procured through the defendant irrigation company (R. 191,

384).
The water that is turned into the lateral .that services
the plaintiffs' property originates in the Strawberry Canal which
carries ninety second feet of water and flows year around (R.
285).

The water is diverted from the Strawberry Canal into the

Fullmer Ditch by lifting a headgate which is locked arid secured
and can be unlocked only by the defendant's water master (R.
285).

The Fullmer Ditch usually only carries six second feet

of water, but on the date of the incident, was carrying twelve
second feet or two streams of water (R.

286~87).

From the _

Fullmer Ditch, water is diverted at a concrete headgate into a
lateral that serves the plaintiffs and nine other property owners
who use the water from one-half hour to two hours each (R. 287-90,
Ex. 19,

20).

The ditch that runs by the plaintiffs' property and the other
nine property owners dead-ends at the property of the tenth landmmer (Julander and Mayberry) and is not used to transport water to

any other area, to irrigate other land or to transport waste water

(R. 203).

Accordingly, unless the ten property owners are scheduled
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for i.rrigati.on, there is no water in r-he ditch rhat r.uns by
the plaintiffs' property (R. 203, 232, 128-30).
Lewis Snow, the seventy year old 1,1ater master for the defendant company, testified he had been the water waster for fourteen
years and was paid a salary of Eight Thousand Dollars a year

(R. 269).

Mr. Snow established that it was his responsibility

to check the headgates and insure they were in good repair (R.

271).

Snow, recognizing the potential danger of flooding and

the dangers created by the water, testified that it was the
company's responsibility to make sure that its employees knew
where the irrigation water was at any given time (R. 272, 275)
and to keep an accurate written record of the location and use
of the water (R.272, Ex.

18)~

Snow testified that during the

fourteen years of his service, he had ahmys known where the
water was (R. 290).

Snow further testified that he had pur-

chased locks f~r the headgates on the main canal and it was
the policy of the defendant to keep them locked (R. 280).
With regard to how the shareholders are informed as to an
upcoming water turn, the defendant, through answers to interrogatories and live testimony,· established· that the watermaster
informed the stockholders of the upcoming water turns by making
a personal call or by having a person up the ditch notify them
(R. 281, 282, 20).

The defendant's policy was that if the share-

holder was not notified, water would not be turned to the
shareholder (R. 281, 282, 20).

Several shareholders testified

that they had never or seldom been contacted by the watermaster
about an upcoming turn (R. 263, 196, 197, 385-86).
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The plaintiffs and the waterrnaster, Lewis Snow, all testified that in fourteen years, the water had never been in the
ditch that services the plaintiffs' property unless prior
notice had been given (R. 282, 288, 204,

387)~

Snow testified

that shareholders had a right to believe they did not have to
worry about water coming down the ditch unexpectedly (R. 281,
282, 288, 289, 314), and the plaintiffs testified that.they
did not think there was any risk that the· water would be.in the
ditch unexpectedly (R. 204, 205, 257, 387).
The landowners along the ditch in question would have a
water turn, depending on the time of year, every ten days to
three weeks, but never more often _than every ten days (R. 204,
391-2, 287).
=.

Needless to s.ay, the water had never been back in

the ditch the day after ·the irrigation turns had been completed
by the ten property owners (R. 203-4 387-88, 391).
The plaintiffs are usually the next-to-last property owners
to irrigate on the ditch in question, Julander and Mayberry being
the last users (R. 135, 211).

Only on four occasions, in the

plaintiffs' experience, had they been the last to irrigate (R.
49, 386).

At nine-thirty, a.m., on August 24,. 1979, 11r·s. Bigler received a call from an up-ditch user that the water would arrive
at the plaintiffs' property at
(R. 388).

appro~imately

two o'clock, p.m.,

The plaintiff, Carol Bigler, had planned to leave

and do some school shopping for her four children that morning,
but before leaving, was informed by Melvina Johnson that the
water would not arrive at the.plaintiffs' property until threeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~4-

thirty in the afternoon (R. 388).

The plaintiff, Car.al

Bigler, went shopping and returned a~ two o'clock in the afternoon to find that the watermaster had turned the water earlier
than expected and that Julanders (normally the--last person to use
the water) had commenced irrigating (R. 388-89).
Julanders informed the plaintiff, Carol Bigler, that he had
told the watermaster to turn the water out of the ditch at
three-thirty, the time Julander would be through irrigating, and
if Biglers wanted to water they would have to contact the watermaster (R. 328, 389).
The plaintiff, Carol Bigler, contacted the watermaster, Lewis
Snow, and he agreed not to turn the water out of the ditch until
four-thirty, p.m., (R. 328, 389-90).
Devan Bigler, :the fourteen year old son of the plaintiffs,
who had irrigated by himself for four years

(R~

327, 391, 206),

·was informed by Julander at three-thirty that Biglers could put
in their headgate to divert the water onto the Bigler. property (R.
328-29).

Devan put in the headgates so that all the water. from

the ditch would go on the Bigler property and no additional
water would go down the ditch to Julander and :Mayberry (R. 329).
The plaintiff, D. J. Bigler, came home from work during the turn
and checked with his son (R. 212).

At four-thirty, the water

was shut off by the watermaster and accordingly the water quit
flowing in the ditch (R. 329-30, 293).
Devan left the headgate in so that the small amount of
water remaining in the ditch would not flow down to Julanders,
who was apprehensive about additional water after his turn was
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completed (R. 201, 202, 407).

The last person to use the

i;,.mter on the ditch routinely left the headgate in for the
next turn because there was no chance of flooding or water
coming down unexpectedly (R. 204, 205, 206 ;:· 2T'7, 332, 387).
The plaintiff, Mr. Bigler, was working graveyards and went
to bed on the evening of August 24th at about four-thirty in
the afternoon (R. 213).

Mrs. Bigler and three of the children

went to a church gathering and arrived home at ten-thirty,
p.m., at which time she awoke Hr. Bigler to go to work (R.
390-91).

The family was awakened at six-thirty the next morn-

ing by the screams of the boys in the bedroom who discovered
twelve to fourteen inches of water and sewage (caused by the
---·

flooding of ·the se·p.tic tank) in their. basement (R. 333-34,
212-216).
Devan went immediately to the back of the property to see
a full stream of water in the ditch (R. 334-35).
The defendant's own expert testified that the water in the
ditch

-o

had

to have been running from four to five and a

half hours after the end of the turn to cause the damage done
to the plaintiffs' residence (R. 476-87).
The defendant maintained at trial that it had no knowledge
of how the water, during the night, got into the plaintiffs'
ditch (Interrogatory No,. 11, R. 518, 21).

The defendant never

conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the flood-.
ing (R. 515-513), though requested to do so on numerous occasions
by the plaintiffs (R. ·229, 230, 231).
Mysteriously, all of the records of the irrigation company
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whi.ch would show wher.e the water was when the Biglers wcrL'
flooded were missing.

The waterrnaster initiallv testified that

the records for fourteen years were gone (R. 273).

The water-

master then testified that someone had entered-his truck
(between July 18th and 20th, 1979) and stolen half of his
rec~rds (R. 514, 276-78).

In spite of the fact that some

records were purportedly stolen on July 18, 1979, three weeks
before the flooding, no explanation was made throughout the
trial for the absence of the records of the water on August 24,
1979, one month after the alleged theft (R. 278-79, 298-99,
514-517).

In· fact, the records were available for all the

shareholders involved up to approximately August 20, 1979,
four days prior to the flooding (R. 274-80).
The defendant's agents and employees testified that the
company should have had locks and chains on the headgates
involved in causing the flooding of the plaintiffs' property
(R. 75-76, 264-65).
The watermaster testified that contrary to his admitted
duties and responsibilities he did not check the ditches on the
night of August 24, 1979 (R. 296, 297) and in fact, checked
them for the last time at four o'clock on the afternoon of
August 24, 1979 (R. 296-97).

The watermaster did not check the

ditches involved in this action again until twelve o'clock noon
on August 25, 1979 (R. 297-98).

A period of twenty hours

went by without any inspection or checking on twelve second feet
of water (R. 296-97).

In addition to the total derogation of

his responsbilities, in failing to monitor the water, no records
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of where the water had gone or where it was scheduled were ever
written (R. 298-99).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AS TO THE STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE.
The trial court gave twenty-five instructions to the jury,
three of which dealt with the specific duties. of both the plaintiffs and the defendant (Instructions 7, 8 and 9; R. 103-5).
Instruction No. 7 informed the jury that the degree of
care which a person is required to.exercise increases in proportion to the hazards to be anticipated.

That instruction is

not excepted to by the appellant and accordingly, no further
comment will be made regarding it.
Instruction No. 8 dealt specifically with the duty of the
irrigation company and provided as follows:
It was the duty of the defendant irrigation
company, its agents and employees, in delivering water to its users, to observe and be
aware of the conditions of their ditches,
the amount of water therein and other exi.stting conditions; in that regard, the defendant was obliged to observe due care with
respect to:
1. To cause notice to be given to
its users of their watering turn
when water is turned into defendant's laterals from which the
user takes its turn.
2. To use reasonable care to turn
the water out of its lateral ditches
when the watering turns are over.
3.

To use reasonable care in knowing
the water is in its irrigation system to prevent the same

w~ere
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fron flowing into ditches where
users are not on notice of its presence, or expectation in such ditch .
.The failure of defendant to exercise ordinary
care in discharging the aforesaid dutv shall
be considered negligence depending o~ the particular surrounding facts and circumstances.
(R. 104).

The appellant's only take exception to the third

subpart of that instruction.

To properly analyze Instruction

No. 8, it is necessary to set out the instruction the court gave
with regard to the responsibility of the plaintiffs.

Instruction

No. 9 provided as follows:
The plaintiffs using the irrigation waters
delivered through defendant's ditches were
required to use reasonable care in taking the
water onto their property, and turning it back
into the defendant's ditches thereafter, to
avoid such waters causing damage to their own
and other persons property along the irrigation
.ditch. In that regard, the standard of care
required of plai.ntiff s would be in accordance
with the customary practice of the users of
water on defendant's ditch; ordinary care in
diverting the stream to their lands and in
turning the water back to the defendant's ditch
after their turn. The failure of plaintiffs
to conform to said standard of care could be
considered negligence, depending on the surrounding facts and circumstances of this case.
(R. 105).
It is the contention of the respondents that the trial
court properly instructed as to the responsibilities of both
parties in this action and that the conduct of the trial court
should not be reversed on appeal for six reasons.
A.

The defendant failed to properly object to the giving

of Instruction No. 8.
The responsibility of trial counsel in objecting to jury
instructions was set out by this Court in Snyderville TransporSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tation Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980).
Chief Justice Hall speaking for the Court stated as

follow~:

Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not
assign as error either the giving or failure
to give an instruction unless he ,fj.r~t proproposes correct instructions, and should the
court fail to give them, to then except
thereto. The exception should be specific
enough to give the trial court notice of
everv error in the instruction which is
complained of on appeal.
Id. at 942.

v.

See also Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co.

Allen Oil Compa.nv, 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 455 (1953);

Redevelopment Agency.of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47
(Utah 1974).
The facts of this case indicate that the defendant-appellants
proposed seven jury instructions for cori'.sideration-rby· the court
=·.

(R. 87-93, 96).

Not one of the instructions describes the duties

and responsibilities of defendant-appellant as set out in Instruction No. 8.

Defendant's proposed Instruction No.· 1 simply states

that the irrigation company is not an insurer against damages
and proposed Instruction No. 2 simply states that the parties in
this action are held to act in accordance with ordinary intelligence and prudence (R. 88, 89).

All of the other instructions

proposed by defendant deals specifically with the responsibilities
of the plaintiffs.
In specifically dealing with Instruction No. 8, counsel
for the defendant at trial simply objected to the giving of the
instruction on the basis that it went beyond any established law
in the state of Utah but failed to propose _any alternative instruction which detailed the responsibility of the irrigation
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company as perceived by counsel for the defendant (R. 571).
In fact, the only comment of defendant's counsel relative to
Instruction No. 8. was as follows:
As to the instructions to be given, ~efen
dant takes exception to Instruction No. 8
on the ground that it goes way beyond any
established law in the state of Utah and is
prejudicial to the defendant. It also makes
the company responsible for acts wav bevond
their control and it basicallv smacks that
absolute liability of the defendant water
company, regardless of other persons.

(R. 571).
It is respectfully submitted that the one paragraph comment

-

by counsel for the defendant was certainly not sufficient to
alert the trial court to the fact that the defendant was only
objecting to subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 nor was it sufficient to detail for the court what the defendant's specific
objection was.

As noted by the Court in Snyderville, supra,

a party, before raising an in~truction as error on appeai must
first propose a correct instruction and then take a specific
exception to the instruction given that is sufficient to give
the trial court notice of every error in the instruction which
is complained of on appeal.

It is respectfully submitted that

the instructions submitted by defendant-appellant were totally
inadequate to describe the defendant's contention as to the duty
of care that was applicable and further, that the exception
taken by counsel to the giving of Instruction No. 8 was inadequate.
B.

Instruction No. 8 correctly states the irrigation com-

pany's standard of care.
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The Utah Supreme Court has analyzed the responsibility of
an irrigation company on a number of occasions.
Utah Code Annotated §73-1-8

(1~53

In interpreting

as amended),. the early Utah

Supreme Court cases clearly stated that the,.,.oWIJ.,.ers of canals or
ditches used for irrigation had the duty of exercising ordinary·
care so as to prevent injury and damage to others and that the
failure to exercise ordinary care and prudence constituted negligence for which the injured party may recover.
and Ueber Counties Canal

C~mpany,

Jensen v. Davis

44 Utah 10, 137 P. 635 (1913);

Chipman.v. American Fork City, 46 Utah 134, 148 P. 1103 (1915);
Mackav v. Breeze, 72 Utah 305, 269 P. 1026 (1928).
The Court dealt with the same question in detail in the
case of West-Union.Canal Company v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigati9n, 208 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1949).

In that case, the plaintiff

claimed that the defendant negligently allowed the water from
the South East ditch to run into Main Street and to wash sand,
gravel, rubb.ish and debris into its canal and to greatly increase
·the quantity of water flowing therein, thereby causing the canal
to fill up at the bridge and to break at the pipe intake at Skinner
Hollow.

The court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded

damages and the· defendant appealed.

The Utah Supreme Court

affirmed and in that decision·cited the long list of early Utah
cases standing for the proposition that an irrigation company is
liable for its negligence.

The Court found that the defendant's

failure to use reasonable care in properly regulating the flow
water into the South East ditch was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's damages.

Id., at 1123.
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In Nestman v. South David County Water Improvement Disrrict,
16 Utah 2d 198, 398 P. 2d 203 (1965), the plai.ntj_f f, a horileowner,
sued the defendant irrigation district for damages caused to
their home and its contents by flooding when tlle defendant's
resevoir gave way.

The Court spent the majority of the opinion

analyzing whether or not the Doctrine of Soverign Immunity applied
but again relied upon and cited to the previous cases for the
proposition that a water supplier is responsible for its negligence.

Id., at 205.

In Anderson v. Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company, 26 Utah 2d
420, 490-P.2d 897 (1971), this Court was faced with an action
which is similar to the case at bar.

In that case, the defen-

dant company delivered water to its stockholders under the
direction of a twenty-four hour a day watermaster who notified
the shareholders of the time for their "turns" at using the
water.

Evidence was admitted in that case to the effect that

a heavy volume of water caused an overflowing of the headgates
and culverts.

con~

Other evidence reflected an overcapacity flow

siderably in excess of that

w~ich

the company and the watermaster

knew would likely damage the property of landowners below.

In

that case, the defendants asserted on appeal that neither the
irrigation company nor its watermaster had any duty to see where
the water went, since that was the duty of the stockholders,
after notice of their "turns".

The same contention is made by

the appellant in this case to the effect that there is no
responsibility on the part of the irrigation company to use
reasonable care to know where the water is in its irrigation
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system or to prevent the water from flowing into ditches
where users are not on notice of its presence.
This Court in Anderson, supra., in reply to the defendants'
contention stated as follows:
We cannot subscribe to such contention,
since it connotes some kind of concept that
an irrigation company and its watermaster
may indulge the luxury of inoculation
against liability by the simple device of
sending a registered or unregistered letter
or.by making a telephone call, if you please,
to its stockholders. Also, it seems to say
that a primary duty not to injure others
can be dissipated by an unwarranted and
unlegal delegation of that obligation in
order to immerse one with holy water
rather than that which may drown oneself.

Id., at 198 !"
There;;·can be no seriou~<· q~estion that the And_erson, supra.,
decision stands for the proposition that an irrigation ·company
must use reasonable care to monitor the location of the water
in its irrigation system and to use reasonable care to prevent it
from flowing into ditches where users are not on notice of its
presence.

Contrary to the argument of appellant in its brief,

the jury instruction given by the court does not impose strict
liability.

The instruction simply requires that the defendant

u_se reasonable care under the circumstances in knowing where
the water is as specified in Anderson, supra.
The Court dealt with this subject again in Erickson v.
Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972).

In that case,

plaintiff sought to recover damages caused to their home and property by irrigation water which flowed there after use by the
defendant.

After the presentation of the plaintiffs' evidence,

the
defendant made a motion to dismiss which was granted by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court.

The facts in the case indicated that the defendant was

an irrigation water user and that his waste water had flowed
on the plaintiffs' property because of a widening of the
Delta-Fillmore highway and because the plaintiffs had constructed a driveway by filling in the borrow pit which also
had affected the drainage.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the

decision of the trial court on the basis that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove that the defendant was in any way negligent and
on the basis that the plaintiffs' contributory negligence in
maintaining the driveway caused their own damages.

In affirm-

ing the trial court, the Supreme·Court made several comments
relative to the responsibility of the irrigation water user.
It is to be~ :..conceded ·to £the plaintiff that
the degree of care increases in proportion
to the hazards to be anticipated; and
that because of the dangers inherent in
the management of flowing waters, the concept of ordinary care and prudence under
the particular circumstances requires that
its management not be left to novices, but
should only be entrusted to persons of some
experience- and skill in the management of
such waters, who would have an awareness of
the various hazards in the failure to
properly control them and would therefore
exercise the degree of foresight and precautj_on which people of such experience
and skill would observe to avoid injury
or damage to others and their property.
Id., at 141.
It is respectfully submitted that the Erickson, supra,
case·stands firmly for the proposition stated in Instruction Ho.
8 that the management of irrigation waters is not to be left to
novices and that the ·degree of care increases. in proportion .to
the hazards to be anticipated and requires the persons who conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trol the water to exercise that degree of foresight and precaution which people of such experience and skill would
observe to avoid injury and damage to a·thers.
The Court dealt once again with the su]:>jest in Dougherty v.
California-Pacific Utilities Company, 546 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976).

In that case, the plaintiff sued the utility company to recover
for damages resulting from·the flooding of their home by the
overflow of the defendant's canal.
favor of the plaintiff.

The trial court found in

In that case, the flooding was caused

by an usually severe rain and hailstorm which caused the canal
to rise and overflow its bank and flood the plaintiff's property.
The defendant contended on appeal ·that the unusually severe
storm was

ari.. Act

of God. ·In retort', ~the. ~6urt stat;ed: _

Whether the occurrence should be so classi-·
fied as "an Act of God'' depends upon whether
the storm was of such magnitude and severity
that it was not reasonably to be foreseen
and guarded against by the traditional,
reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances.
Id., at 882.·

The Court then stated that since there was evidence that
cloudbursts of considerable magnitude are.noted in the area,
that the trial court had the right to adopt the plaintiff's view
of the evidence.

Again, the Court cited to Utah Code Annotated

§73-1-8 and cited it for the proposition that persons who handle
irrigation water must be held to the standard of due care under
the circumstances and that includes taking cognizance of the
fact that the degree of care increases in proportion to the
hazards anticipated.

Id., at 882.

The standard set out in the
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Utah cases is entirely consistent with the weight of authoriry.
See cases cited in Brizendine v. NamQa Meridian Irrigation
District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976); Pince v. Phelen,
496 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1972).

....

The case law in Utah supports the court's instruction that
the defendant has a duty to use reasonable care in knowing where
the water was in its irrigation system and to prevent the same
from flowing into ditches where users are not on notice of its
presence.

Even aside from the rulings of the Supreme Court,

the defendant's waterrnaster testified that it was his responsibility, recognizing the potential danger of flooding to make sure
that he and the other employees of the company knew where the
irrigation ·water -was at any

given-~' time.

(R. 272, 275).

Further,

Lewis Snow, the watermaster, testified that it was his responsibility to keep an accurate written record of the location and
use of the water throughout each day (R. 272, Ex. 18, 275).
Snow testified that during the fourteen years of his· service,
he had always known.where the water was and that the water,
during that time, had never gone down the ditch by the plaintiffs'. property unannounced (R. 282, 288, 204, 387).

Finally,

the watermaster testified that shareholders had a right to
believe that they did not have to worry about water coming
down the ditch unexpectedly (R. 281, 282, 288, 289, 314), and
the piaintif.fs testified that they did not ever think that there
was any risk that the water would be in the ditch unexpectedly

(R. 204, 205, 257, 387).

In total derrogation of the defendant's

responsibility, defendant company never conducted an investigaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ti.on to determine the cause of ·the flooding (R. 515-518) ·
Further, the records of the defendant company were never provided.

The failure of the defendant company to justify or ex-

plain the absence of the records became
at trial.

almost~

a laughing matter

It is respectfully submitted that the irrigation

company either purposefully destroyed the records or_ simply did
not furnish them despite demand by plaintiffs' counsel on the
basis that they were incriminating.

The defendant's own agents

and employees testified that there should have been locks and
chains on the headgates involved in causing the plaintiffs'
damage which was the responsibility of the defendant company.
Most importantly the vlatermaster testified that he. left the
water constituting twelve second

fee~

at the· Fullmer_

ditch and ninety second feet of the Strawberry Canal unattended
for a period of twenty hours.

It is respectfully submitted that

the instruction given by the court correctly states the law as
established by this court and also correlates with the responsibilities admitted to and undertaken by the defendant irrigation
company.
C.

The defendant irrig8:tion company does not have the

right to abandon the course of conduct undertaken by it.
It is the respondents' position that Jury Instruction No.
8 correctly states the law and that, in addition to the fact
that it is a matter required by the applicable case law, the
defendant's undertaking of the responsibility of monitoring the
water at a given time and its representations to its shareholders
that it monitored the water and that: they had no reason to fear
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that the water would be in the canal unexpectedly imposes an
additional duty upon them.
The duty of a volunteer who undertakes to act was expressed
by Justice Cardozo in Glanzer v. Shepard, 223 N._.Y. 226, 135 N.E.
275 (1922.):

• . • It is ancient learning that one who
assumes to act, even though gratuitously,
must thereby become subject to the duty of
acting carefully, if he acts at all • ·••
135 N.E. 275, 276.
The modern counterpart of the rule set forth by Justice
Cardozo is contained in Restatement 2d of Torts, §323:
One who undertakes gratuitously or for a
consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the others
person or things, is subject to liability
for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to
perfonn his undertaking, if (a) his failure
to exercise such care increases the risk
of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered
because of the other's reliahce upon the
undertaking.
It is respectfully submitted that all of the evidence in
the case established that the defendant took upon itself the
responsibility of monitoring the ·water and knowing its whereabouts at any given time.

In addition, the defendant took upon.

itself the responsibility of keeping accurate records to determine where the water was at any given ti.me.

Based upon those

undertakings, the company represented to its shareholders that
it had no reason to worry_ or 0ouard aoainst
the harm of water
0
coming unexpectedly in their ditch.
All of the evidence supports the application of the Restatement
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2d of Torts.

The defendant failed to properly perform the

duty it undertook in that the company failed to monitor the
water and to keep accurate records.

Those failures certainly

increased the risk of flooding and as the plaintiffs testified throughout the proceedings, they left the headgate in
on the basis that it was their understanding that water would
not be in that ditch unexpectedly.
D.

The appellant cannot claim for the first time .on_··

appeal that. there were other causes of floo.ding to the plaintiffs'
property.
In contending that Instruction No. 8 improperly characterized the law, appellant's argue on pages 6. and 7 of their brief
that no evidence was present·ed at the trial ·court. ·as

·to

the source

of the water that came down the ditch ·in the mj_ddle of the
night.

Contrary to the appellant's assertion of the fact, the

plaintiffs' son, Devan, testified that when he was awakened in
the morning by the

la~ge

amount of water and sewage in the

basement, he went to the back of his property where the irrigation ditch was situated and observed a full stream of water at
that time (R •. 334-35).

In addition, the defendant's
own exoert
.
~

testified that the water would have to be running from four to
five and a half hours to cause the damage that it did to the
plaintiffs' property (R. 476-87).

To suggest at this juncture

in the proceeding that the plaintiffs did not me.et their burden
of proof in showing the source of the water is simply rebutted
by the evidence.

E.

Subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 does not impose strict
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liability.
The appellant argues at great length that-: subpart- 3 of
Instruction No. 8 given to the jury imposes strict liability
upon the defendant irrigation company.

The instruction expli.citly

states that the defendant has a duty to use reasonable care in
knowing where the water is in its irrigation system to prevent
the same from causing damage.

The instruction does not state

that if the defendant did not know where its water was that it
was negligence.

In fact, the jury well may have concluded that

the defendant had used reasonable care in knowing where the
water was in the irrigation system and that reasonable care
does not require that the defendant know where the water is at
each ·and-every point in time.
The problem that the appellant has on appeal is that the
argument contravenes· the representation of the defendant com·pany made at trial that it did know where the water was at
each and every point in time and that it considered it a responsibility to both know ·and to document

~lhere

the water was.

Likewise, the instruction requires only that the defendant
irrigation company

us~

reasonable care in preventing the water

from flowing into ditches where users are not· on notice of its
presence.

The instructio"n does not indicate that if the jury

finds that water is in a ditch or notice has not been given,
that it is strictly liable or that it is even negligent.

Again,

the jury could have well determined· that the facts and circumstances as presented by the testimony did not warrant an imposition of liability on the part of the defendant simply because
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the water was in the ditch.

The jury was given the prerogative

to wetgh all of the facts and circumstances in the case ..
Finally, it was again the testimony of the· defendant's
agents and employees at trial that imputed lJaQ.ility to them.
It was the defendant's agents and employees that testified that
the policy of the irrigation company was that no :water would be
turned to a water user unless notice had been given to them.
It was the defendant's agents and employees who testl.fied.that
in fourteen years no water had ever been in that ditch unannounced and that the persons operating in the Mapleton Irrigation Canal Company had. a right to assume that water would not
be in the ditch unless they were put on notice.

In fourteen

years, the ditch had never.been used for run-off

wat~r

or waste_

.. water from any other distribution system aside from the routine
regular irrigation turns.

The

r~presentation

to the Court that

Instruction No. 8 is tantamount to imposing a strtct liability
test upon the defendant-appellant, is simply without merit.
F.

Subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 does not require the

irrigation company to give notice every time the ditch is used
to transport water.
On page 10 of the appellant's brief, the point is made that
subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 requires the irrigation company
to notify all property owners when water is passing through
·the sublateral ditch to another location.

Again, appellant's

argument totally misconstrues the instruction.
There is nothing in subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 that
requires the irrigation company to notify users every time water
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is in a ditch.

The instruction· simply requires the irrigation

company to use reasonable care to keep water fr.om flowing into
ditches where users are not on notice of its presence or expectation in such ditch.

It is impossible to analogize the facts

of the present case to the broad principles announced in the
appellant's brief.
This is not a case where the ditch in question is somet:imes
used to provide irrigation water to property owners and at
other
times is used to transoort water downstream for another
.
~

series of property owners or to conduct waste water.

The testi-

mony at trial was that the ditch in question was never used to
transport water to any other group of landovmers than the ten
property owners set out in thecc statement of facts.

It was

further the testimony that the ditch in question was never used
to transport waste water or used for any other purpose. · Again,
the testimony by Doc Snow, the watermaster; the plaintiffs and
other persons testifying was that for fourteen years water had
never been down that ditch except to irrigate the land
belonging to the ten property owners.

It was based upon the

peculiar nature of the ditch in question that the court gave
the instruction that the irrigation company owed its shareholders
reasonable care to keep water from going down the ditch unless
water ·users were put on notice of its presence or expectation.
Again, the fact that the irrigation company did not give notice
does not mean by itself they were guilty of negligence.

The

instruction says firmly that they are only required-to use
reasonable care and does not state that the lack of notice
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equates with negligence.
POINT II
THE JURY FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART
OF APPELLt\NT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
;-·

The standard that this court uses in reviewing the determination made by a jury has been stated on a number of occasions.
In Cinpron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court noted:

,.

The existence of conflicting testimony _is
of no warrant. It wa$ the jury's prerogative to determine which evidence was to be
credited and to draw reasonable inferences
from that evidence, Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d
154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969); of course we
view the evidence in the light most
supportive of the verdict. Johnson v. Corn. wall Warehouse Co., 15 Ut.ah .. 2d 172 ,·_ 389
~>P .Zd 710 (1964)... : .
.

. Id. , at 7 3 2.

This Court has also stated that in reviewing a jury determination, the court will assume that the jury belived those
aspects of the evidence which sustained the findings and judgment and therefore makes it analysis of the case and draws its
conclusions on the basis of facts so found.

Gessner v. Dairyland

Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 1980); Ute-Cal
r
men~

Lan~

Deveiop-

~
vorp.
v. Sa t,ner., 605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980) ;· Lamkin v. Lynch,

600 P.2d 530 (Utah. 1979).
It is respectfully submitted that there was ample evidence
upon which the jury could find the defendant negligent.

All

of the bases are set for.th in the statement of facts and accordingly only a summary of the evidence will be provided.
Fir.st, Lewis Snow, the watermaster testified that he
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recognized the potential dangers of flooding and that in
accordance.with the recognition of that hazard,· it was the
company's responsibility to make sure that he or other employees
knew where the irrigation water was at any,gi\b.en time.

Despite

the company's recognition that it was their responsibility to
make sure that the location of the water was known, the agents
and employees of the defendant left twelve second feet of water
essentially unaccounted for and unmonitored for twenty hours.
Second, the .agents and employees of the defendant testified that it was the company's responsibility to keep an accurate
written record of the location and use of the water.

In that

_regard, the watermaster testified that during the fourteen years
--

'
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,. ·of· his ·service, he had always known' where: 'the water was ··and had.
kept records relating to its use.

Despite the fact that the

company recognized that as a responsibility, the appellant
simply refused and neglected to fulfill its committment.

The

testimony indicated that some records were taken supposedly
between July 18th and 20th.

The defendants were never able to

show any water users whose records of use had been lost.

Further,

even though records were taken between July 18th and 20th, no
explanation-was ever made as to the location of the water records
after that period of time up and through the date of the flooding.

Both the watermaster, the director and president of the

company were unable to reply or answer the simple queries.
Third, the watermaster for the defendant testified that it
was his responsibility to purchase and inspect locks for the
headgates and to maintain control over those diversionary
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structures.

The evidence at trial indicated that the agents

and employees of the defendant, after the flooding, admitted that
there should have been locks on the headgates that divert the
water to the plaintiffs' property.

Obviously,-the lock on the

head(;ate would have prohibited the diversion of the water down
the ditch that led to the plaintiffs-respondents' ·property
without an overt act by the defendant's agents and employees.
On page 13 of the appellant's brief, the statement of the
agents and employees of the defendant to the effect that the
gates involved should have been chained and locked is referred
to as a hearsay statement.

It should be noted that counsel for

the defendant did not object to the evidence (R. 230), and the
statement of the president of the boarc1 and_-one of t_he board of
directors is clearly within the scope of Utah Rules of Evidence
63(7) and (8) which relate to statements made by persons in

their individual or representative capacity.
Fourth, in answers to interrogatories, in depositions
and on the witness stand, the agents and employees of the defendant
testified that it was the policy of the Mapleton Irrigation
Canal Company to infonn the stockholders individually by making
a personal call or having a person-up the ditch notify them,
every time water was to be in their particular ditch.

-Explicitly,

the defendants stated in answer to interrogatories that if the
shareholder was not notified, water was not to be turned to the
shareholder.

Further, Doc Snow, the watermaster for the

appellant testified that based upon his representations to them,
shareholders had a right to believe that they did not have to
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worr.v about water corning dmm their ditch unexpectedly.

Con-

trarv to the explicit representations and warrantees of the
agents and employees of the defendant, the defendant's agents
and employ·ees failed to mon.itor the water and take the other
necessary steps to comply with their own self-imposed standard.
The plaintiffs-respondents and the other persons on the ditch
sjmply had no reason to believe that there was any risk that
the water could get into the ditch unexpectedly.
Fifth, the wa termaster .for the appe.llant and the respondents testified that in fourteen years, the water had never been.
in the ditch unexpectedly and that at no time, was waste water
or other overflow water ever in the ditch.

Further, all of

the testimony· was· conc.lusive that ,the ditch which serviced the
respondents had no other purpose and did not serve to convey
water to landowners at some point distant from the plaintiffs.
In direct contravention of the experience of the respondents
and the representations of the appellant, 'the appellant ran
its system in such a manner wherein water could go unmonitored
for twenty hours and the defendant would have no record or any
other. means· available to him to isolate the problem or the
source.
Sixth, the respondents were told by the agents and employees
of the def end.ant that the water turns, depending on the time
of the year, would be separated from ten days to three weeks.
Contrary to the representations that water turns would never
be closer together than ten days, the appellant failed to
monitor the ditch or take other steps to assure the accuracy of
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their representations.
In short, the jury had ample cause to believe that the
·appellant had failed to exercise ordinary care in discharging
the duty set out in Instruction No. 8 and to, therefore, find the
appellant negligent.
The last point raised by the appellants under Point II
that the jury finding of negligence was improper, is the argument that the court's exclusi.on of testimony relating to how·
other irrigation canal company's work

\·laS

error.

Counsel for

the appellant proffered the testimony of the expert as follows:
He would testifv that inasmuch· as he worked
with most of th~ irrigation companies in
the valley, in fact, all of them, I believe,
and am most familiar with their operation,
and those irrigation companies that had a .
t 1..irn system, such as the Springville system,
and he was familiar with those, the obligation was upon the water users to open and
close his headgate, and he was to be responsible for the headgate at all times.
That's
all.
(R. 567).

It is respectfully submitted that the proffer made

by counsel was totally inadequate.

It is hard for counsel for

respondents to understand the meaning or intent of the proffer.
The proffer would seem to indicate that the expert would testify
that he was familiar with the operation of a number of irrigation companies that had a turn system similar to the Springville
system and that under those turn systems, the obligation was
upon the wateruser to open and close his headgate and that the
waten1ser was responsible for ·that headgate at all times •. The
proffer does not state that the turn system or Springville
system is analogous to that used by the Mapleton Irrigation Canal
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Companv.

Further, there is no proffer to the effect that the

by-laws, polici.es and procedures of the other syste~s in the
val le·.r are similar. to any degree to that used by the appellant·
Further, there is no indication in the proffer~- that the expert
was familiar with the irrigation companies at the time that
the flooding took place.

As stated by the trial court, "the

only relevant testimony in that regard would be the custom on
·this particular ditch" (R. 67).

POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
The test that this court has used in reviewing the actions
..

of a jury'"'were set . 'out in Point· II.

.

-

.

'

Again, the facts relating

to the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were

set out in full in the statement.of facts.

Again-, only a

basic recital of those facts is set forth.

The jury had ample

evidence to support the belief that the respondents were not
contributorily negligent in leaving the headgate in place on
August_ 24, 1979.
First, for fourteen years, water had never been down the
respondents' ditch unexpect.edly.
Second, the ditch that serviced the respondents' property
was not used to transport water to any other locat{on and was
not used to transport waste water and was, in fact, only used
on a scheduled water turn.
Third, the water turns on the ditch had intervals from ten
days to three weeks.

The agents and employees of-the ·appellant

and the respondents testified that at no time during the four-
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teen vears had water been in the ditch the day after. a '.va ter
turn.
Fourth, the agents and employees of the defendant explicitly
represented that no water would in the ditch unless. the water
users were informed.
Fifth, it was the custom and practice·of the last person
to use the water to leave the headgate in so that whatever water
remained in the ditch as the water was shut off would not be
diverted on property which had already watered.
Sixth and finally, the respondents testified unequivocably
that they did not even comprehend the risk that their property
would be flooded by le.aving the headgate in.
·CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Instruction No. 8
correctly states the law of the State of Utah as it has been
promulgated by the case law and by statute.

Further, the in-

struction clearly sets forth the duty as promulgated by the
appellant itself upon which the respondents had a right to
rely.

Section 3 of Instruction No. 8 together with the

remainder of Instruction No. 8 are all couched in the duty of
the defendant to use reasonable care and does not mandate that
the defendant has specific mandatory duties and actions.

The

instruction explicitly states that the failure of the defendant to exercise ordinary care in discharging any of the re. sponsibilities set out in Instruction No. 8 could be considered
negligence depending upon the.particular surrounding facts and
circumstances.
It is the respondents' position that there is ample eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_'H1

dent in the transcript upon which the jury could supp?rt a finding of negligence on the part of the appellants and the lack of
any co~tributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
The jury, in weighing the evidence and tes~·imqp.y, simply found
that the appellant had failed to observe the duties recognized
by law and recognized by its mm regulations and procedures·

It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the jury
and the damages assessed only compensate the respondents for
a clear breach of duty by the agents and employees of the
appellant.
DATED this

L.9'

day of August, 1982.

MAILED a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to

Mr. Michael L. Deamer, UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER, Attorneys for
Appellants, Suite 514 Boxton Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111; dated this

/Ci

day of August, 1982.
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